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ANTITRUST AT THE TURN OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
A VIEW FROM THE MIDDLEt
ROBERT T. PITOFSKYtt
It is an exceptional honor to be invited to deliver the Lewis
Bernstein annual lecture on antitrust at St. John's University
School of Law. Lew Bernstein, representing the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), was the lead
attorney on the first private litigation in which I participated
after law school. It was a lengthy criminal price-fixing trial
before a jury-an unusual experience for a young lawyer.1 Lew
was extremely competent, hard-working, diligent, and decent-
an exceptional representative of what is best in public service. It
is most satisfying to be invited to participate in this program in
his honor.
I will examine today, in fairly broad terms, the location of
Clinton antitrust enforcement in the spectrum of antitrust
policy.2 My broad theme is that there has been an overall
"convergence" of antitrust thinking in the United States. There
are, of course, differences at the margin depending on whether
the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC or "Commission") are led by liberals,
moderates, or conservatives, but the differences in recent years
have not been radical. To appreciate the present, it is helpful to
consider enforcement levels in the recent past.
t This Article is an updated version of the Lewis Bernstein Memorial Lecture
given at St. John's University School of Law in 2002.
tt Sheehy Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Of
Counsel, Arnold & Porter. The author is former Chairman of the FTC.
1 See United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., 24 F.R.D. 285, 287 (D.N.J. 1959) (alleging
price fixing by five leading pharmaceutical houses in the sale of Jonas Salk's polio
vaccine).
2 This paper deals entirely with the substance of antitrust. For the companion
piece on antitrust remedies see Robert T. Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the
Twenty-First Century: The Matter of Remedies, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2002).
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I. RECENT HISTORY OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
In the 1960s, United States antitrust enforcement was
extremely aggressive. For example, practices and transactions
such as conglomerate mergers3 and arrangements based on
expectations of reciprocity4 were added to the zone of illegal
behavior. The area of abbreviated treatment to find illegality-
the so-called per se approach-was expanded to cover additional
categories of behavior.5  Antitrust considerations regularly
trumped exclusivity rights granted to innovators of intellectual
property.6 Price discrimination with little or no discernable
market effects was frequently challenged under the Robinson-
Patman Act. 7 Additionally, any transactions among small
players in unconcentrated markets were blocked on what would
now be regarded as tenuous theories.
The most extreme examples of questionable enforcement
occurred in the merger area. In one notable case, Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States,8 a merger in the shoe business was declared
illegal because of its effects in the vertical line when a
manufacturer with four percent of the production market
acquired a distributor with less than two percent of the nation's
retail sales, despite the fact that there was low concentration
and moderate or low barriers to entry at both the manufacturing
and retail level. In another example of extreme activism, United
States v. Von's Grocery,9 a horizontal merger between retail
3 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 n.2 (1967) ("A pure
conglomerate merger is one in which there are no economic relationships between
the acquiring and the acquired firm.").
4 See FTC v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965) (holding reciprocity
arrangements within the scope of antitrust legislation).
5 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (addressing
non-price vertical restrictions), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207
(1959) (discussing boycotts); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)
(addressing tie-in sales).
6 See Bruce B. Wilson, Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use,
Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions, in ANTITRUST PRIMER: PATENTS,
FRANCISING, TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS 11, 12-14 (1970); see also Bruce B. Wilson,
Address at the American Patent Law Association (Jan. 21, 1975).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a-13b, 21a (2000); see, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.,
395 U.S. 642, 650 (1969) (reinstating jury verdict for the plaintiff-petitioner for price
discrimination); Utah Pie Co. v. Contl Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 687 (1967) (finding
violations under the Robinson-Patman Act amendments for price discrimination).
8 370 U.S. 294, 345-46 (1962).
9 384 U.S. 270, 272-73, 277-79 (1966).
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supermarkets in Los Angeles producing a combined market
share of approximately eight percent was blocked. These
initiatives were backed consistently by the Warren Court, a
majority of the Court believing that Congress intended a very
aggressive antitrust program. 10
The heightened enforcement levels of the 1960s led to a
reaction in the Bar, in the private sector, and in academia. The
result was a steady but substantial moderation in antitrust
enforcement." By the 1980s, a little more than a decade later,
all that was left of antitrust enforcement at both the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ and the FTC were regular challenges to
hard-core cartels, some facilitating practices that supported
cartel behavior, and a few challenges to very large horizontal
mergers that were thought to contribute to high concentration
and cartel-like behavior. During the eight years of the Reagan
Administration, there was an absence of enforcement initiated
against vertical and conglomerate mergers, monopolization and
attempts to monopolize-at least after the DOJ settled the
earlier challenge to AT&T by supervising a breakup of the
telephone monopoly, vertical distribution arrangements,
including minimum price-fixing, exclusive dealing
arrangements, and tie-in sales, boycotts, and all forms of
discriminatory pricing. 12
An effort to restore something more than a minimalist
antitrust enforcement program was initiated during the first
Bush Administration, and many of the practices deleted from
enforcement efforts were restored during the period 1988-1992.
The goal of Clinton Administration antitrust was to be
moderately aggressive-that is to build upon the initiatives of
the first Bush Administration but with serious attention to
private sector claims of efficiency and innovation, and a
recognition of fundamental changes brought about as a result of
the increase in international competition. Put another way, the
goal was to produce a program falling somewhere between the
excessive activism of the 1960s and the minimalist enforcement
10 See Gary Minda, Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 48 SMU L. REV.
1749, 1755-57 (1995) (discussing a peak in antitrust enforcement under the Warren
court).
11 See id. at 1755 (stating that in the 1980s, antitrust enforcement moved
toward a minimal enforcement level).
12 See generally Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REV. 399 (1986).
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of the 1980s, in the hope that a program could be defined in a
way that would survive future elections and consequent changes
in administrations.
II. A MATTER OF SHARED PREMISES
Why has antitrust enforcement stopped careening from
aggressive enforcement based in some part on a populist ideology
to minimalist enforcement based on hostility to the core
assumptions of antitrust? To a large extent I believe this is
because of a fairly widespread agreement on premises. There
will always be outliers-for example, people on the enforcement
margin who believe that virtually all mergers among large firms
should be blocked and people on the free market margin who
believe that cartels are unstable, self-containing, and need not be
challenged by the government. But a broad range of informed
people now finds common ground between those extremes. The
premises mentioned above described below.
A. Goals of Antitrust
Antitrust in the Untied States is now primarily, though not
exclusively, designed to protect the welfare of consumers. The
enforcement agencies and the courts are occasionally willing to
step in and protect an equally efficient small firm from being
flattened by a much larger company-for example, by imposing
limits on below-cost pricing13 or by preventing an incumbent
powerful retailer from organizing a boycott of its suppliers
against a smaller new entrant. 14 These are rare interventions,
however, and occur not because of some sense that the small
business community is made up of more worthy citizens, but
rather because of the view that long term it is important to the
welfare of consumers to keep market access open and prevent
artificial increases in barriers to entry.15
13 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 229
(1993).
14 Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 939 (7th Cir. 2000).
15 The principal area of divergence between European and American antitrust
law is the EU's apparent willingness to protect competitors rather than the
competitive process. See Dimitri Giotakos et al., General Electric/Honeywell-An
Insight Into the Commission's Investigation and Decision, COMPETITION POLICY
NEWSLETTER, Oct. 2001 (discussing the European Commission's July 3, 2001
declaration that the General Electric/Honeywell merger was incompatible with the
common market).
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B. Aggregation of Market Power
The free market is usually effective in preventing the
aggregation and abuse of market power. As a result, it is
important for the enforcement agencies to be cautious about
intervening to prevent aggressive competition, even by firms
with substantial market power, and to be particularly cautious
about proposing restructuring of existing enterprises. On the
other hand, extreme examples of abuse must be effectively
challenged.
C. Enforcement Emphasis
The central concerns of antitrust should be to detect and
deter cartel behavior-usually price fixing, bid rigging, and
market division-and to block horizontal mergers that lead to
high levels of concentration and then to coordinated price and
non-price competition. In practical terms, that means that the
government would put most of its resources into anti-cartel and
anti-merger review and enforcement.
D. Subordinate Practices
The area of antitrust where Clinton era enforcement was
most different from the level of enforcement in the Reagan years
related to challenging practices that facilitated cartels or led to
the accumulation or maintenance of high levels of market power,
where there were few, if any, efficiencies or other justifications.
As noted earlier, during the Reagan years, there was no
enforcement whatsoever against non-horizontal mergers and
joint ventures, boycotts, minimum resale price maintenance,
exclusive dealing contracts, tie-in sales, attempts to monopolize,
and monopolization. That agenda was restored during the Bush
years and that restoration continued at a somewhat heightened
level during the Clinton Administration.
E. Per Se Versus Rule of Reason
There is now wide acceptance of the proposition that the
value to per se rules is limited. There are a few practices-hard-
core price-fixing, bid rigging, and market division-that are so
likely to produce anti-competitive effects and efficiencies are so
rare that a full-blown trial is unnecessary. Since the 1960s, per
se treatment has been eliminated or substantially reduced in
20021
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
connection with maximum resale price maintenance, 16 boycotts,'17
tie-in sales,'8 and information exchange programs. 19
F. Price Discrimination
Price discrimination is almost never an anti-consumer
strategy and, therefore, challenges to price discrimination under
the Sherman Act,20 and particularly according to the quasi-per se
rules of the Robinson-Patman Act, 21 should be approached with
great caution.
G. Economic Input
The courts are generally comfortable with the view that
formal economic analysis is an aid rather than a hindrance to
sensible conclusions about pro and anti-competitive effects.
III. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT DURING THE 1990S
Let me turn now to an effort to support my earlier
statement-that antitrust enforcement in the 1990s reflecting
those shared premises, during both the Bush and Clinton
Administrations, was moderately aggressive but at the same
time sensitive to incentives to innovate, to claims of efficiency,
and to the realities of global competition. In this discussion, I
will usually illustrate points with examples of FTC enforcement;
however, DOJ enforcement, with which I am not as familiar,
generally follows the same patterns.
A. Resources
The clearest indication of continuity in enforcement is the
fact that the majority of resources during the 1990s were
committed to challenges to cartel behavior and large horizontal
mergers. The DOJ devoted perhaps one-third of its resources to
investigation and challenges to hard-core cartels, and another
one-third to merger review. The FTC devoted over two-thirds of
16 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997).
17 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985).
18 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-17, 46 (1984).
19 See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446-47 (1978).
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
21 See 15 U.S.C. §13 (2000).
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its resources to merger review. 22 Part of this commitment
reflected the fact that the country witnessed perhaps the
greatest surge of merger activity in its history during the 1990s,
and merger review, therefore, was essential.23
One difference in approach relates to the targets of cartel
enforcement. In the 1980s there was vigorous enforcement
against hard-core cartels, but the targets tended to be relatively
small companies engaged in road paving or production of
cement, and collections of small competitors and trade
associations. In 1990, the total fines for cartel behavior was
about twenty-four million dollars-not out of line with earlier
years. In the 1990s, the DOJ conducted a vigorous campaign of
challenges to cartel behavior that affected vast amounts of trade.
In 1999, fines against hard-core cartels totaled $1.1 billion, a
more than forty times increase in collections.24 As an odd
reflection on the growth of global competition, over ninety
percent of the fines collected were against international cartels. 25
B. Efficiency Defenses
In 1997, the Clinton Administration affirmed and clarified a
section of the DOJ-FTC Merger Guidelines that allowed
efficiency claims in defense of mergers. 26 Previous guidelines
had been grudging in their interpretation of efficiency defenses,
and, as a practical matter, restricted the effect of efficiency
claims to an influence on prosecutorial discretion. Once the
government was in court challenging a merger, it was inclined to
22 Chairman Robert Pitofsky, Statement of the FTC: Mergers and Corporate
Consolidation in the New Economy (June 16, 1998) (presented to the Committee on
the Judiciary, United States Senate), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/
9806/merger98.tes.htm.
23 See id. ("The number of mergers reported to the antitrust agencies... has
increased dramatically from 1,529 filings in... 1991 to an estimated 4,500 in...
1998."); see also DOJ ATTY GEN. FIsCAL YEAR 1999 ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP.,
Mar. 31, 2000 [hereinafter 1999 ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP.] (stating that 1998 and
1999 pre-merger review more than doubled from a few years earlier and that the
DOJ is experiencing the "highest level of merger activity in its history"), available at
http://usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ar99/fullrep.htm.
24 See ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 25 ("The Antitrust Division...
brought in ... more than $1.1 billion, including a $500 million fine against one of
the largest vitamin manufacturers in the world.").
25 See id. ("[Tihe Antitrust Division has obtained over $1.5 billion ... in
criminal fines, well over 90 percent [of which] were imposed in connection with the
prosecution of international cartel activity.").
26 Revision to the DOJ and FTC Joint Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1997).
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ask the court to restrict efficiency claims to the point where they
were virtually irrelevant to the result.27
Under the revised guidelines, efficiencies would be counted
in favor of the legality of a merger only if they were shown to be
substantial, merger specific (in the sense that comparable
efficiencies could not be achieved in a less anticompetitive way),
and likely to be passed on to consumers. The revised guidelines
were clear that efficiencies would almost never justify a merger
to monopoly or near monopoly. Satisfying the many conditions is
a formidable task, but that was anticipated by the people
revising the guidelines. The central idea was to allow
efficiencies as a tie-breaker in close cases-usually mergers of
five-to-four or four-to-five in a properly defined market-but not
to allow efficiencies to justify extremely high levels of
concentration. While no party has yet succeeded in persuading a
court that an otherwise illegal merger was justified by presence
of likely efficiencies, there have been instances in which the
Commission declined to challenge a transaction as a matter of
prosecutorial discretion because of the presence of substantial
efficiencies.
C. Restoration of Targeted Enforcement Against Vertical and
Conglomerate Mergers
As noted, there was no vertical or conglomerate merger
enforcement activity by the federal agencies in the 1980s. In the
1990s, vertical enforcement was restored but typically in a
cautious way against transactions that involved very substantial
market shares. An example would be the proposed merger
between Barnes & Noble, the largest retail bookseller in the
United States, with thirty-four percent of national sales, and
Ingram, the largest book wholesaler in the United States with
twenty-three percent of national sales.28 The theory of the case
27 See, e.g., Mem. in Supp. of Pis' Mot. in limine Relating to Efficiencies, at 4,
United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 1991-92 TCM (CCH) % 69,647 (S.D.
Iowa 1991).
28 See Richard G. Parker, Remarks at the Meeting of the International Bar
Association (Sept. 28, 1999) (providing the FTC's analysis for its decision to
challenge the Barnes & Noble/Ingram merger and noting that the parties
abandoned their attempts after the press released information about the FTC's
intention to challenge the merger), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/
barcelona.html; see also Stephen Labaton, Staff of F.T.C. Is Said to Oppose Barnes
& Noble Bid to Wholesaler, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1999, at Al; Stephen Labaton, Book
[Vol.76:583
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would have been that smaller bookstores competing with Barnes
& Noble would not have received comparable discounts, terms of
sale, delivery dates or marketing specials from a wholesaler
owned by their direct competitor. The merger collapsed before
being challenged in court. Other vertical cases involved
comparable market shares. As to conglomerate enforcement, the
FTC has brought only one case in seven years.29
D. Restoration of Antitrust Agenda Without Resort to
Questionable Per Se Rules
Much of the activist agenda of the 1960s was based on per se
rules. In succeeding decades, the Supreme Court has indicated
that it will maintain per se approaches only where it is
persuaded that the conduct at issue is almost always likely to
produce anticompetitive effects and is almost never justified by
good business reasons.30 As a result, courts are unlikely to
expand the zone of per se coverage-or even maintain previous
per se approaches-unless there is considerable experience with
the competitive effects of the conduct at issue.
In recognition of that trend, 1990s antitrust either
abandoned per se approaches or, more frequently, prepared or
litigated cases on alternative theories of per se versus rule of
reason. A few examples are highlighted below.
1. Boycotts
The FTC challenged Toys "R" Us ("TRU") behavior in
inducing toy manufacturers, such as Mattel and Hasbro, not to
sell to price clubs, or to sell on discriminatory terms, to prevent
the price clubs from competing effectively with TRU.31 In almost
all respects, the case was a virtual duplicate of the facts
reviewed in 1959 by the Supreme Court in Klor's, Inc. v.
Chain Gives in, Barnes & Noble Won't Seek $600 Million Deal, N.Y. TIMES NEWS
SERv., June 3, 1999, 1999 WL 19740337.
29 FTC v. Questar Corp., No. Civ. 2:95-CV-1127 S, 1995 WL 1053848 (D. Utah
1995).
30 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284 (1985) (narrowing application of per se rule regarding boycotts);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (overruling
per se application to vertical non-price restrictions and noting that "departure[s]
from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect
rather than-as in Schwinn-upon formalistic line drawing").
31 Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.32 The Commission noted the
similarity but also observed the wide-spread criticism in lower
courts of the Klor's per se doctrine. It therefore litigated the
case, in the alternative, on a broad rule of reason basis, following
the roadmap set out by the Supreme Court in its 1985 Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co.
opinion.33 The Commission not only addressed market power,
purpose, and effect, but also fully explored the alleged business
justifications of the agreement between TRU and the toy
manufacturers. 34 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
on the basis of the full rule of reason analysis. 35
2. Resale Price Maintenance
The FTC restored challenges to agreements to establish
minimum resale prices. In the largest such case by far, the
actions by compact disc music companies to influence retail
prices were not ordinary manufacturer/retailer agreements on
price. Rather, the vertical agreements related to public and in-
store advertising, and the sanction against companies not
following recommended prices was the denial of certain kinds of
marketing assistance. The Commission elected to prepare the
case on the basis of a full rule of reason, though the Supreme
Court has never departed from its view that minimum resale
price maintenance is illegal per se, it announced its reasons for
the challenge in rule of reason terms when the case settled.36
E. Price Discrimination
In the 1950s and 1960s, the FTC was aggressive in bringing
price or service discrimination cases under the Robinson-Patman
32 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
33 472 U.S. 284, at 297-98 (1985).
34 See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, No. 9278, 1998 FTC LEXIS 185 (Oct. 14, 1998).
35 See Toys "R" Us, 221 F.3d at 928.
36 Press Release, FTC, Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of Restraining
Competition in CD Music Market (May 10, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/cdpres.htm. The FTC stated that "the [Big Five]
required retailers to advertise CDs at or above the [minimum advertised price]." Id.
In a related development, the Commission joined the DOJ in an amicus brief in the
Supreme Court advocating that the court rescind its previous rule that maximum
resale price maintenance is also illegal per se. The private parties urging the
abandonment of the per se rule were successful. See State Oil Co. v. Khan. 522 U.S.
3, 15 (1997).
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Act.37 The DOJ resisted any such interpretation and has never
brought a case under that statute. In the 1990s, the FTC
brought one Robinson-Patman case--a record of minimal
enforcement that would be hard to beat.
The one case involved discounts by McCormick and Co., the
world's largest manufacturer and distributor of spice products
sold through supermarkets and other grocery outlets. 38
McCormick offered substantial discounts to some large
supermarket chains, but not to competing stores. The payments
commonly required that the customer allocate to McCormick a
large portion, often as much as ninety percent, of the shelf space
devoted to spice products. Since the discriminations were
substantial, and the competing purchasers that were adversely
affected operated in an area where profit margins were low and
competition keen, the Commission could have rested its case on
the precedent of FTC v. Morton Salt,39 which found injury to
competition when only those factors were present. Not content
with the virtual per se approach of that Supreme Court case, the
Commission went on to demonstrate a wide array of additional
factors to demonstrate an injury to competition, including the
shelf space allocation.
F. Duration Issues
When the government entered an order, its standard course
was to incorporate no time limit. Parties were required to
demonstrate a significant change in fact or law in order to be
relieved of the obligations of an order previously accepted. 40
As the economy grows more and more dynamic, there is an
increasing risk that orders in place for many years will be
inappropriate for changed market conditions and will do more
harm than good. As a result, the Commission in the mid-1990s
37 AM. BAR ASSN, AM. BAR ASSN STUDY OF THE FTC 67 (1969).
38 In re McCormick & Co., Inc., No. C-3939 (F.T.C. April 27, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/mccormick.do.htm.
39 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
40 See, e.g., Press Release, DOJ Antitrust Division, Protocol to Expedite Review
Process for Terminating or Modifying Older Antitrust Decrees (Apr. 13, 1999),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/1999.2355.htm; see also
JOHN J. FLYNN ET AL., ANTITRUST STATUTES, TREATIES, REGULATIONS,
GUIDELINES, POLICIES 313-14 (2001) (referring to changes in the factual
circumstances or the law as it relates to the decree in question).
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cut the duration of all competition orders to twenty years. 41
Even twenty years can be a long time in certain dynamic
sectors of the economy. Consider, for example, new software
programs that became available in the last ten years and
changes in the market for Internet service providers in the last
five years. As a result, the Commission introduced orders of very
limited duration. The first instance involved conditions imposed
on Time Warner-Turner before allowing the merger to proceed-
an order that would expire in ten years. 42 The most extreme
example up to the time it was entered was the five-year order
imposed on AOL-Time Warner as a condition for permitting that
merger.43
CONCLUSION
Statements by the new leadership at the Antitrust Division
of the DOJ and the FTC have emphasized "continuity" rather
than "departures" from the antitrust enforcement programs of
the 1990s. There has been nothing like the level of strife and
criticism of prior policies that characterized earlier decades. By
comparison, criticism has been muted and moderate. Time will
tell whether the Bush I and Clinton Administrations have
identified a middle course that will survive political changes and
election results.
41 See Press Release, FTC, FTC to "Sunset" Existing Administrative Orders
Automatically After 20 Years Under New Rule (Nov. 20, 1995) ("The [FTC]
announced today that ... orders issued prior to Aug. 16, 1995 will expire
automatically after 20 years after they were issued .. "), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/9511/sun3.htm.
42 Time Warner Inc. and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., No. C-3709 (F.T.C.
Feb. 3, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c3709.htm.
43 America Online, Inc. and Time Warner, Inc., No. C-3989 (F.T.C. Apr. 17,
2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c3989.htm.
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